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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : CaseNo.20070722-CA 
CINDY WILLIAMS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of forgery, illegal possession of cocaine, and 
providing false personal information to an officer, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Terry T. Christiansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied probation and imposed the 
statutory indeterminate prison terms, as recommended in the presentence investigation 
report? 
Standard of Review. An appeals court "will not overturn a sentence unless it 
exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally 
relevant factorsf,] or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute 
abuse of discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, \ 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-203, governing indeterminate terms of imprisonment 
for felony convictions, states: 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-204, governing indeterminate terms of imprisonment 
for misdemeanor convictions, states: 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to 
imprisonment as follows: 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety 
days. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (West 2004); illegal possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2006); and 
providing false personal information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (West 2004). R68-81, 83-84. As part of the 
plea agreement, the State dismissed charges for a second forgery, heroin possession, and 
attempted theft by deception, and recommended that any prison term be suspended. R2, 
75. In the plea statement defendant acknowledged, "I know that any charge or sentencing 
concession or recommendation of probation or suspended sentence . . . made or sought be 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney [is] not binding on the judge." R76. 
The trial court ordered Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) to prepare a 
presentence report (PSI). R83. On July 315 2007, defendant was sentenced to concurrent 
terms not to exceed five years on the forgery and drug possession convictions, and to a 
concurrent ninety-day term on the conviction for providing false personal information. 
R89-90. 
Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal on August 28, 2007. Rl 00-101. Defense 
counsel filed an amended notice of appeal on September 21, 2001. R105-106. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime 
On November 1, 2006, defendant presented a check to be cashed at a Wal-Mart 
store in Salt Lake County. PSI Addendum at 3; see also R3-4. The check was made 
payable to Leta Rae Williams, drawn on the account of Peak Investment Group, LLC, 
and purportedly signed by Richard Peak. See R3-4. Wal-Mart security staff apparently 
detained defendant and called the police. See R3. 
Defendant identified herself as Leta Rae Wise to a responding officer. Id. She 
had in her possession a driver's license in the name of Leta Rae Williams and a birth 
certificate in the name of Leta Rae Richardson. Id. She admitted to the officer that she 
knew the check was fraudulent and that she did not have a valid driver's license. Id. The 
driver's license she possessed was forged. R4. 
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Defendant was arrested and booked. Id. During the booking process, an officer 
searched her and found two baggies that field-tested positive for cocaine and heroin. Id. 
Facts relevant to sentencing 
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend that the court 
suspend any prison terms. R75; Rl 14:10. At sentencing, defense counsel argued for 
probation, stating that about a week after the offense, defendant stopped using drugs and 
had not used drugs since that time. Rl 14:5-7. Counsel stated that defendant was under 
supervision on an ankle monitor program, that she was on a list awaiting funding for 
intensive outpatient drug treatment, and that her completion of the ankle monitor program 
would "roughly coincide" with the availability of the funding for her outpatient 
treatment. Id. Defendant stated that she had not used drugs for nine months, that she was 
working, and that she was caring for her elderly mother. Rl 14:8-10. 
At sentencing, the State did "a no recommendation for prison." Rl 14:10. The 
State argued, however, that defendant still needed jail time and that any probation should 
be a "no-tolerance type." Rl 14:10-11. 
The PSI, on the other hand, recommended that defendant be sentenced to prison. 
PSI Addendum at 2. The PSI set forth a substantial criminal history beginning in 1982 
and continuing through 2007. PSI at 6-8; PSI Addendum at 5.1 Defendant had been 
convicted of prescription forgery in 1982 and 1987; illegal use of credit cards in 1990; 
AP&P prepared the PSI for sentencing on another conviction imposed on 
defendant in December 2006. See PSI at 1. AP&P prepared the PSI Addendum for use 
with the PSI for sentencing defendant in this case. See PSI Addendum at 1. 
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forgery in 1995; theft or retail theft in 1991, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2003, and 2005; and drug 
or paraphernalia possession in 1990 and 2001. PSI at 5-7. Her criminal history indicated 
two past prison commitments, paroles after each commitment, and revocations of those 
paroles. PSI Addendum at 6. The PSI also indicated that defendant had a total of 95 
aliases on record, although defense counsel indicated at sentencing that a few of the 
aliases were actually defendant's names at various points in her marital history. PSI at 1; 
R114:3. 
The PSI and PSI Addendum also showed that defendant was involved in 
additional criminal activity following the crimes in this case. Defendant was charged 
with misdemeanor drug possession and giving false information to an officer on 
November 10, 2006, nine days after the incident in this case. PSI at 1-4, 8. She later 
pled guilty to those offenses. PSI at 2. At the time of sentencing in this case, she was 
also charged with forgery and drug possession allegedly committed on February 4, 2007, 
three months after the crimes here. PSI Addendum at 5. 
The trial court addressed defendant's claims of rehabilitation, stating that "It's 
easy for anyone to stand up before a Court and say, I've changed," but concluding that 
defendant's "actions sp[oke] a lot louder than [her] words." Rl 14:12. The court noted 
that defendant's criminal record went "back to 1982," was "basically one crime after 
another," and was "not getting any better." Rl 14:11. The court observed to defendant, 
"You make horrible decisions and not only do you use drugs, but you commit crimes to 
support your drug habit. And so you victimize this community time after time after time 
after time." Rl 14:12-13. 
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Stating that "enough is enough/' the court imposed concurrent terms of zero to 
five years on defendant's forgery and drug possession convictions and zero to ninety days 
on her conviction for giving false personal information to a police officer. Rl 14:13. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant claims that the trial court denied her probation without considering 
her character, personality, attitude, or rehabilitative needs. Defendant did not object 
below to the trial court's sentencing decision or claim that the trial court had failed to 
consider any legally relevant factor. Thus, her claim is unpreserved. Because she does 
not argue any justification for review of her unpreserved claim, this Court should decline 
to review it. 
2. In any event, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its 
discretion by sentencing her to prison. She has not shown that her sentence exceeds 
statutory limits, that the court failed to consider any legally relevant factor, or that the 
actions of the trial judge were inherently unfair. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT IS UNPRESERVED, AND IN ANY 
EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO THE STATUTORY TERMS 
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to suspend the 
execution of [defendant's] sentence and place her on probation without considering her 
character, personality, attitude or rehabilitative needs." Br. Appellant at 6 (boldface, 
underlining, and upper case omitted). Her claim is both unpreserved and without merit. 
A. Because defendant's claim is unpreserved and she argues no exception to the 
preservation rule, this Court should decline to review it. 
Defendant asserts that the issue was preserved below. Id. at 2. In support, she 
references the sentencing hearing at 7. Id. (citing Rl 14:7). Defendant requested at the 
hearing, and specifically at that point in the hearing, that the Court "give her the 
opportunity of probation." Id. She did not, however, argue that failure to grant probation 
would constitute an abuse of discretion. See Rl 14:1-14. She did not claim that the Court 
had failed to "consider[] her character, personality, and attitude or rehabilitative needs." 
Br. Appellant at 6 (boldface, underlining, and upper case omitted). 
It is well settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11, 10 P.3d 346; see also State v. Thomas, 1999 
UT 2, % 29, 974 P.2d 269 ("Absent any indication that this issue was raised at trial, it 
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (declining to address 
claims not raised in the trial court). To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant "must 
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enter an objection on the record that is both timely and specific." State v. Rangel, 866 
P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). "The objection must 'be specific enough to give the 
trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel [or defendant] complains." State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water 
Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996)). "The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial 
court the first opportunity to address a claim that it has erred," and, if necessary, to 
expeditiously correct the error. Rangel, 866 P.2d at 611. The preservation rule "applies 
to every claim, including constitutional questions," unless an appellant alleges and 
demonstrates "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, <f 11. 
Defendant made no objection that gave the trial court notice of the error she now 
claims on appeal. As stated, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel attempted to 
persuade the trial court that defendant should be given probation. See Rl 14:108. 
Counsel did not, however, argue that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying 
probation or by failing to consider defendant's "character, personality, attitude or 
rehabilitative needs." Br. Appellant at 6 (boldface, underlining, and upper case omitted); 
see also Rl 14:1-14. Thus, defendant did not preserve the claim she now raises on appeal 
The "specificity requirement arises out of the trial court's need to assess 
allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific 
legal doctrine placed at issue." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993). A 
general objection usually does not provide that context. "The 'mere mention' of an issue 
without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that 
issue for appeal." Id. (citation omitted). 
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See State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ffif 11-12, P.3d (addressing failure to 
object at sentencing to trial court's consideration of various factors). 
Further, defendant has not argued any justification for review of her unpreserved 
claim. This Court should therefore decline to review it. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (court may decline to consider unpreserved issue where 
defendant did not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" justified 
review). 
B. In any event, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused 
its discretion by sentencing her to the statutory terms on her convictions. 
Even if defendant had properly preserved her claim, she could not prevail because 
the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it sentenced her to the statutory 
terms and denied probation. 
1. Trial courts have wide latitude and discretion when making sentencing 
decisions. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion "by failing to adequately 
consider [defendant's] character, personality and attitude before denying her the 
opportunity of probation." Br. Appellant at 7. Specifically, she notes that both defense 
counsel and the State "recommended that [she] be given the opportunity of probation." 
Id. She continues to claim that she had stopped using drugs and had "stay[ed] clean" 
from November 2006 to July 2007 when the sentencing hearing was held. Id. 
Defendant's argument fails because she cannot demonstrate that her sentence exceeds the 
statutory limits, that the court failed to consider any legally relevant factor, or that the 
actions of the judge were inherently unfair. 
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Defendants face a particularly heavy burden when challenging a trial court's 
sentencing decisions. An appeals court "will not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds 
statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant 
factors [J or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, f 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, "the fact that [a defendant] views his 
situation differently than did the trial court does not prove that the trial court neglected to 
consider the [legally relevant] factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,114, 40 P.3d 626. 
"The trial court has broad discretion in imposing sentence within the statutory 
scope provided by the legislature." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 
1991). Where the trial court followed the law, it cannot be said that "no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978). 
'"[A] defendant is not entitled to probation.'" State v. Olsen, 2005 UT App 137U, 
*1 (quoting State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. 
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1957)) ("Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so 
no matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may be able to 
demonstrate to the trial judge"). Rather, "the court is empowered to place the defendant 
on probation if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the 
public interest." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051 (citation omitted). But the decision to grant or 
deny probation "is within the complete discretion of the trial court." Id. at 1049. 
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Moreover, the trial court is not bound by the recommendations of the prosecutor or 
defense counsel. See State v. Gladney, 951 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah App. 1998) ("Even if the 
State had made a recommendation . . . the court would not have been bound by that 
recommendation. The plea agreement specifically stated that the judge was not bound by 
any sentencing recommendation.") (citing State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 
1978)). 
Finally, a sentencing court is not usually required to state on the record its 
consideration of every legally relevant factor. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ | 11. Instead, this 
Court may assume that the sentencing court considered the factors unless "(1) an 
ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides 
that written findings must be made, or (3) a prior case states that findings on the issue 
must be made." Id. Absent these circumstances, this Court "will not assume that the trial 
court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper factors as 
required by law." Id. 
2. The trial court properly exercised its discretion. 
No abuse of discretion occurred in this case. First, the sentences imposed are all 
within statutory parameters. Defendant's sentences on her two third degree felony 
convictions were for terms not to exceed five years. Her sentence on her class C 
misdemeanor conviction was for a ninety-day term. Those terms do not exceed statutory 
limits. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 & 204. 
Second, nothing suggests that the trial judge failed to consider a legally relevant 
factor. Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider "her character, personality, 
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attitude or rehabilitative needs." Br. Appellant at 6. She cites to no authority, however, 
suggesting that the court was required to consider these matters. Only her citation to 
State v. Helms suggests that a trial court must give "adequate weight to certain mitigating 
circumstances." 2002 UT 12, \ 15. Helms, however, dealt with factors that must be 
considered in imposing consecutive sentences, where statutory law requires the court to 
"consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id. at \ 9 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) 
(1999)). Here, the trial court did not impose consecutive sentences. 
In any case, the sentencing court ordered a PSI and reviewed its contents with both 
parties. See Rl 14:3-5, 10-11. The court heard from defendant and defense counsel, both 
of whom argued that defendant had been "clean" for an extended period, was trying hard, 
was working, was on a waiting list for intensive out-patient therapy, had "a positive mind 
set," and would benefit from probation. See Rl 14:5-14. Even assuming that these 
factors were legally relevant, the record shows that the trial court considered them. 
Defendant asserts, however, that the trial court "[in]adequately considered" these 
matters. Br. Appellant at 10. She does not cite to any record support for that assertion. 
See id. Her argument appears to be not that the trial court failed to consider the factors at 
all, but that she disagrees with how the trial court balanced them. This does not help her 
because her claim, reduced to its essence, is that the trial court viewed her situation 
differently that she did. As explained, a sentencing court does not abuse its discretion 
merely because it views a defendant's situation differently than the defendant does. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14. 
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Moreover, as explained, this Court may assume that the trial court considered 
every legally relevant factor, whether or not it stated such consideration on the record, 
unless an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable or unless statutory or 
case law explicitly requires findings on the record. 
Here, defendant points to no ambiguity of facts and to no statute or case law 
requiring that the trial court make findings regarding her character, personality, attitude, 
and rehabilitative needs. This Court therefore will not assume that the trial court did not 
consider these matters. 
Third, the decision not to grant probation was not inherently unfair. As explained 
a defendant is not legally entitled to probation. See Olsen, 2005 UT App 137U, *1; 
Rhodes, 818P.2dat 1051; see also Sibert, 310 P.2d at 392. Defendant therefore had no 
right to probation. Further, defendant had acknowledged in her plea statement that any 
recommendation from the prosecutor was not binding upon the trial judge. See R76; see 
also Gladney, 951 P.2d at 248. 
Moreover, based on the record before him, the trial judge could reasonably have 
determined that imposing prison terms represented a more just disposition than probation. 
See, e.g., State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (no abuse of discretion 
where trial court emphasized punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him); State v. 
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-19 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally 
give considerable weight to circumstances of crime). Defendant claimed to have become 
"clean" about a week after the November 1, 2006 crimes occurred. Rl 14:5. The PSI, 
however, showed that defendant had been charged and convicted of possessing drugs on 
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November 10, 2006, nine days after this offense. See PSI at 1-2, 8. The PSI Addendum 
noted that defendant had been arrested again on February 4, 2007, and again charged with 
possessing drugs. See PSI Addendum at 5. Moreover, as explained, defendant had an 
extensive criminal record showing illegal drug and other criminal activity from 1982 
through 2007. See PSI at 4-8; PSI Addendum at 5. Based on this record, the trial court 
did not act unfairly when it determined that incarceration was more appropriate than 
probation. Such a disposition is well within the discretion of a sentencing court. 
On appeal, this Court should decline to overturn the trial court's determination. 
The trial court was in the most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic 
assessment required to fashion a just sentence. See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 
(Utah 1997) (sentencing "necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court") 
(quotations and citation omitted). Certainly, the sentencing court's assessment of 
defendant's character may have been based at least partially on its personal observation 
of defendant's body language, demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which are reflected 
in the record on appeal. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
In this case, the trial court evaluated the evidence, exercised its discretion within 
the bounds of the law, and imposed a proper statutory penalty for the offense to which 
defendant entered her plea. Because it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court," the court did not abuse its discretion. Gerrard, 
584 P.2d at 887. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this oH day of fah^cuiu , 2007. 
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